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From a purely academic point of view, abstract and lifeless, the current state of post­
communism represents the chaos of postmodernism that is loathed by modernists whereas 
progress toward democracy suggests privilege, purpose, centralised planning, and rationality, 
all of which make it a modernist phenomenon loathed by postmodernists (Rosenau, 1992).
In ivory tower discussions, the modernists speak and write about human rights, free 
markets, and democratic principles as items that can be exported to the sub-civilised post­
communist nations (Fukuyama, 1992).
The modernists seek to impose order onto the chaos of Balkanisation, a Russia run by 
mafias, "disorganised" economic systems, and nationalist and ethnic strife in formerly com­
munist nations (Ritzer, 1992).
On the other extreme, one finds the postmodernists expressing indignation at the sug­
gestion that any person, dogma, or concept in the West is somehow "privileged" in a chaotic 
universe devoid of truth. Why should the West's versions of human rights, free markets, and 
democracy be privileged? (Bauman, 1993).
Out of intellectual hubris or desire for consistency, the postmodernists in academia can­
not allow this move, for if one privileges these notions regarding the politics of post­
communism, one must admit the existence of truth and principles in all other areas of dis­
course. But if the postmodernists were to allow this, then they would be forced to privilege 
"narratives" (or "stories") of truth, valour, moral causes and other phenomena as distin­
guished from falsehood, cowardice, immorality, and evil. This, the postmodernists cannot do. 
In academia as well as politics, despite some exceptions, the general response to recent wars 
from Croatia to Rwanda (and most recently, Kosovo), has been along the lines of the post­
modernist journalist: If there is no truth, all one can seek is opposing points of view. So, the 
Croats have a point of view, and the Serbs have a point of view - both are equally legitimate 
and equally illegitimate. Similarly, the Tutsis and the Hutus have opposing points of view. So 
long as one is attentive to opposing points of view, one has performed one's duty as an 
open-minded intellectual in this, our so-called post-modern age. Implicit in this seemingly 
even-handed approach is the promise that the post-modern journalist, scholar, or politician 
will be able to return to the modernist West with its privileged concepts and privileged 
life-style.
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If old-fashioned modernist distinctions and differentiation must be invoked, then they 
must be invoked when it no longer matters, when calling genocide what was labelled a "civil 
war" no longer makes a difference.
President Clinton referred to genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia after the killing had 
stopped. During the killing, his Administration called it tribal warfare.
This is one aspect of what I refer to as "postemotionalism" in my recent book 
(Meštrović, 1997).
Moreover, the theoretical scaffolding of postmodernism carries with it the expectation 
that it will lead to tolerance, or can lead to tolerance (especially in Zygmunt Bauman's writ­
ings.). (Bauman, 1989; 1991; 1992).
But I agree with Akbar Ahmed (Ahmed, 1992) that intolerance and ethnic strife, not 
tolerance, seem to be the rule, not the exception, in the years that have accompanied the 
postmodernist discourse. Another plank in the post-modern scaffolding is that it purports to 
rebel against the grand narratives of the Enlightenment, which are depicted as having con­
tributed to all sorts of evils, from the Holocaust to Communism (Lyotard, 1984).
The assumption is that this rebellion will produce a less evil world than that handed 
down to us by the Enlightenment legacy. Thus, the model often given is that of the "salad 
bowl" of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism to replace the oppressive model of assimila­
tion. But the unforeseen consequence of multiculturalism has often been an emotional orgy 
of revenge, grievances, and contempt between the sexes and between other cultural groups in 
the West, and old-fashioned ethnic strife in postcommunist nations (Meštrović, 1994).
What is the postcommunist nation supposed to do in this state of affairs? To seek the 
derivatives of the Enlightenment such as rule of law, rational and free markets, and the kind 
of civil society that leads to tolerant citizenship not only invites mockery by the post­
modernists who point out that Communism was derived from the Enlightenment. Addi­
tionally, it is to seek ghosts from the past, because it is no longer self-evident that these lofty 
sounding phenomena exist in the West. Rather, the West indulges itself in a simulation of 
these modernist products and tries to cover up its uncivil society (from the perspective of its 
minorities), elite class structure, and other irrationalisms (Baudrillard, 1983).
On the other hand, to defy the West's new colonialism, to expose its hypocrisy, to seek 
one's own way toward citizenship and democracy is to run the risk of losing IMF funding, of 
being punished by economic sanctions, of being excluded from membership in coveted or­
ganisations from the EU to NATO, and so on. What should political, intellectual, and other 
leaders in postcommunist nations do under these circumstances?
In this analysis, I do not intend to stay locked within the parameters of the modern- 
ist-postmodernist debate. Rather, I shall attempt to transcend this debate by referring to 
what I call postemotionalism. I do not want to give glib replies to what I consider to be diffi­
cult, ambivalent, and ambiguous positions. And I would like to focus on the pragmatic and 
the real, not just the concepts of ivory tower academicians. Thus, one should begin with the 
observation that the serious issues being considered by postcommunist countries as to their 
political and economic futures are being eclipsed by President Clinton's sex life.
Moreover, the drama of President Clinton's political problems vis-ä-vis sex is occurring 
in a postemotional society. Postemotional society harks back into the distant past in order to 
make sense of the present, from the Serbs invoking a grievance from the year 1389 in order 
to justify their violence in Kosovo and Greece using the memory of Alexander the Great in 
order to block the existence of Macedonia to France and England still nursing their wounds 
at losing their stature as founders of civilisation and the Enlightenment. Similarly, Special 
Prosecutor Kenneth Starr and the Republicans are using the moral code of the Puritan era in 
order to hurt President Clinton politically when no other means worked (Whitewater, 
Filegate, Chinagate, Paula Jones and the other events from recent history fizzled out.) Yet 
1998 is not the era of the Scarlet Letter! To the genuine surprise and disappointment of
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much of the rest of the world - which is trying to cope with present problems and visions of 
the future - a moral code that used to evoke genuine emotions among the Puritans is being 
used today in order to depict the President as a criminal.
The American public, too, is postemotional. It does not see modernist things like per­
jury, obstruction of justice, or even adultery in the old-fashioned sense of an emotional out­
rage and desecration of marriage. At some level, the public knows that if anyone other than 
the President were charged with these things, it would be a very emotional matter indeed, 
likely to result in jail time, fines, or divorce and serious financial penalties. Yet it responds 
with a blase attitude, not moral indignation, when it considers these matters relative to the 
President. It's not just that the economy is doing well: the public is clearly aware that its emo­
tions are being manipulated by both the Republicans and the President.
The postemotional President Clinton is a lawyer in an Administration that boasts more 
lawyers than any other in US history. His use of language and demeanour betray a lawyer's 
manipulative style. Thus, the President claimed that according to some definitions of sex and 
relationship, he did not lie when he denied having either with Monica Lewinsky. He was sim­
ply withholding information. He admitted to "misleading" others, but not to asking them to 
lie. Lawyers routinely work with the most emotionally charged events of life - death, divorce, 
injury, crime - but always in the least emotional manner possible. And so it is with President 
Clinton's performance: it is flawless, legally and professionally, but it lacks the real emotional 
fire of both love and contrition. But note that he and his Administration do something simi­
lar when it comes to foreign policy: They did not lie when they called Belgrade-sponsored 
genocide a "civil war" although they "misled" the world. They did not lie when they imposed 
"peace" in Bosnia, even though this "peace" has led to the de facto ethnic partition of Bosnia. 
And so on for Chechnya and other problem areas in the postcommunist world.
There are at least ten characteristics to this political interplay between the post- 
emotional President and postemotional society. Leaders in postcommunist nations might 
benefit from recognising these characteristics. My reference to the "postemotional President" 
refer both to President Clinton and to a more generalised, ideal-type of such a President in 
the USA, Western Europe, or eventually, postcommunist nations. I see the postemotional 
President as the harbinger of the political future with implications for the postemotional citi­
zen and postemotional education. It is impossible to do more than to sketch the parameters 
of this complicated interplay:
1. The postemotional President is "nice," and thereby neutralises any real 
opposition to him
Only a generation ago, all of the world's political leaders scowled.
Smiling, "nice" leaders would have been considered weak or non-serious. They either ig­
nored or defied public opinion polls. Transparently racist and sexist remarks were expressed 
openly in the street and the media. In the current fin de siecle, at least in postemotional soci­
eties, much of that has changed. While most political leaders in postcommunist countries still 
scowl and do not smile, successful political leaders such as Bill Clinton smile and are re­
garded as "nice" by their constituents. Tony Blair is a clone of Bill Clinton in this cultural re­
gard and is the vanguard of the postemotionalization of European politics. It was possible to 
get really mad at a scowling President Nixon, but nearly impossible to feel rage at the nice 
President Clinton. Postemotional society is a society without real opposition. If the opposi­
tion is perceived as "not-nice" - as is the case now with Newt Gingrich, the non-smiling Bob 
Dole and the Republicans - it will evoke fear, not support.
For example, the old-fashioned, inner-directed, and definitely not-nice President Tru­
man dropped the atomic bomb on Japan without much explanation or concern for public
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opinion. But contemporary postemotional leaders, such as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, can 
cut aid to welfare mothers (arguably a mean act) without any risk to their popularity because 
they explained this act of "tough love" as a nice thing to do for poor mothers.
In international affairs too. Clinton withheld weapons from Bosnians while they were 
being slaughtered by Serbs and he kept a cruel economic embargo on Iraq that arguably 
killed hundreds of thousands of innocents, among other acts that were definitely not "nice." 
But despite some opposition to these acts, Clinton prevailed with the majority because he ra­
tionalised his decisions in nice terms: Giving Bosnians weapons to defend themselves would 
only have prolonged the war, and he was trying to help the Iraqi people by punishing their 
leader, Saddam Hussein, not them.
The lesson to be drawn for the Presidents of postcommunist countries is obvious: deal 
with the West through public relations firms and elect Presidents who are charming and 
know how to smile the Western smile. Milosevic has learned this lesson, and was America's 
darling at Dayton, whereas the non-smiling Tudjman and Izetbegovic were not liked by the 
Americans. Elect Presidents who are "nice" by Western standards, and you will go far.
2. The postemotional President must be capable of holding one's emotional fire
Old-timers and rare inner-directed types who manage to hold postemotional society at 
a distance today exhibit behaviours that most people find objectionable, namely: when pre­
senting their views in private, to a family, or larger audience, they shout, use their hands 
wildly to gesture, and sometimes turn red in the face or exhibit other physical symptoms as 
signs of emotional commitment to what they are saying. A generation ago, showing one's 
emotional fire was a sign of sincerity, even distinction. Who will ever forget images of 
Khrushchev banging his shoe on the table at the United Nations? Or Hitler shouting madly 
at the Nazi rallies? In the current fin de siecle in the West - and it is important to note that 
emotional fire is still exhibited in Eastern Europe, Russia, and other areas outside the West - 
the inability to hold one's emotional fire in check is the kiss of death when it comes to re­
spectability. Everyone knows, and expects, that TV commentators, professors, politicians, 
ministers, doctors, and almost everyone in postemotional society must present the most emo­
tional messages (death, catastrophe, joy, indignation) in the blandest terms possible.
Contrast, for example, the relatively remarkable composure of Americans on TV who 
have survived a tornado with the weeping, wailing, and other disturbingly emotional reac­
tions of their counterparts in a non-western nation to a natural catastrophe. The post­
emotional type in the West must not throw his or her self on the casket of a loved one, for ex­
ample, though this is acceptable behaviour outside the West. The postemotional widow must 
not wear black for years after her husband's death; she must "bounce back" in about a week. 
And the postemotional President must not express genuine contrition, passion or other emo­
tion vis-ä-vis Monica Lewinsky, terrorism, or any other phenomenon.
Despite calls for such emotional catharsis by some Republican Senators, the truth is 
that American society would not stand for it - it demands tightly scripted and controlled pre­
sentations of the postemotional President's distilled emotions. This includes anger at terror­
ists: it must be a carefully-managed anger that cannot be misconstrued as blood lust.
Except for President Kucan, Presidents in most postcommunist nations still shout and 
turn red in the face when they speak. If they seek the financial fruits of the West's simulated 
concern for them, then they must emulate the self-control of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.
3. The postemotional President is manipulative
Political leaders have manipulated their constituents in all places in all epochs, of 
course. Yet pre-postemotional societies, and some non-western societies today, had or still
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have rigid caste, class, and other hierarchical systems that demanded or still demand instant 
obedience to authority. In by-gone days, a President might have denied a sexual scandal - 
had anyone dared to make it public - and his authority would have been enough to deter fur­
ther probing. This was routine in Communist countries: defy Brezhnev or Tito or any other 
Communist leader, and you're out of the picture. But in postemotional society, where most 
people are other-directed and consider themselves to be everyone else's equals, manipulation 
becomes normative and authoritarianism is gauche. Thus, President Clinton's early denials of 
sex became the starting-point for further disclosure to the "jury of his peers," namely, the 
public, which feels almost equal to "Bill" in a democratic society. But it's not just the Presi­
dent whose authority has been levelled this way in postemotional society. Western children 
now manipulate their parents for privileges that simply would have been unheard of a gener­
ation ago. For example, since corporal punishment is on the decline or nearly extinct in the 
USA, most parents and authorities use the "time out" as punishment. In a "time out," the 
child is sent to one's room or a room in a school. But increasingly, children today demand to 
watch their favourite videos on their television sets in their bedrooms during the time out. Or 
children negotiate their compliance with rules by extorting other concessions out of their 
parents, such as extending bedtime. In general, social relationships, from the most private to 
the most public, involve the negotiation of "deals" based on implicit or explicit "agendas."
For example, opinion-makers have made the observation that Hillary and Bill Clinton 
represent the marriage of the 21st century, based not on love, but a common agenda. Femi­
nists support Bill Clinton, not the women he is purported to have harassed, because he 
shares their agenda. Even university professors and students in the US have arrived at an im­
plicit "deal" based upon an understood "agenda:" The students won't bother the professor by 
coming to office hours if the professor won't make too many demands on the students such 
as requiring essay tests or papers. Politicians are allowed many scandals that might have 
brought them down in the past so long as they don't make demands on the voting populace, 
such as sending young men and women off to wars in which they might come back in body 
bags. In general, the postemotional self in prepared to make explicit as well as implicit deals 
in all walks of life, and he or she seeks out others who share one's agenda. The American 
public has made an implicit deal with the postemotional President Clinton: We will tolerate 
all of your scandals and let you manipulate us so long as you keep the not-nice conservatives 
off our backs. In this way, the American public manipulates the President too, because it 
fears the tendency of conservatives to want to impose Puritanism in the current fin de millen­
nium.
The restructuring of postcommunist family and educational institutions implied by 
these insights would involve a shift from authoritarian obedience to negotiation and "deal- 
making" between authority figures and those without power. This is the only way to prepare 
the next generation for a world that seems to be following the American model of social rela­
tions. Internationally, postcommunist leaders must learn to discern the West's agendas, and 
wed themselves to that agenda. Ironically, Slobodan Milosevic was the one who did this very 
well from the outset of the war that began in 1991: he knew that the West's agenda was to 
suppress secessionism and that the West would support him, implicitly, against the "wild" (but 
actually mild-mannered) secessionist, Milan Kucan. Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic 
were simply naive, and wrong, to think that the West would support their drives for inde­
pendence. Independence is simply not on the West's agenda today.
4. The postemotional President must possess superb social skills in order to
succeed, or even survive politically
I anticipate the rejoinder that the postemotional President must have different social 
skills from those that were required in tradition-directed or inner-directed eras. Of course,
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this is true to some extent: all politicians must possess some degree of social skills suitable to 
the eras in which they live. Here I am claiming something else, namely, that public relations 
have become an absolutely essential ingredient of all social life. Hence, the President of the 
United States as well as the government agencies that he controls all hire veritable armies of 
public relations experts whose job is to filter raw reality into something palatable for the 
masses. But something similar is true for celebrities, CEOs, corporations, schools, hospitals, 
churches, stores, and most other social institutions in the West. It is understood that one 
"slip-up," one "misstep," one politically incorrect statement caught by the media can result in
lawsuits, loss of public support, and eventual demise for one's public life. For example,
Monica Lewinsky's attorney, Mr. William Ginsburg, made the cardinal mistake in post- 
emotional society of writing an "open letter" to Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr that was 
emotional and combative. He was replaced almost immediately with a team of lawyers more 
seasoned in public relations whose first act was a "photo opportunity" in which they remained
mute in response to all questions, yet smiled nicely.
Arguably, President Tudjman of Croatia has been the most hurt postcommunist leader 
due to his non-reliance on public relations experts. His jokes, remarks, and writings have 
been manipulated by such experts in the West in order to depict him as a racist and anti- 
Semite. Again ironically, it is President Slobodan Milosevic who has emerged as the most 
skilled postcommunist leader in terms of public relations: His current actions in Kosovo are 
explained as the imposition of "law and order" onto a land besieged by "terrorists." The 
postmodernists and modernists will never resolve their philosophical debates concerning 
truth. But pragmatically, the important insight is that in the postemotional world, public rela­
tions is everything, and truth is irrelevant.
5. The postemotional President regresses to childhood
Postemotional society indulges its children at the same time that it exposes them to 
adult themes at increasingly young ages: There are pilgrimage sites devoted to childhood 
such as Disneyworld, Six Flags and others; most restaurants have playgrounds on the pre­
mises, from McDonald's to Mr. Gatti's pizza and many others; cable television offers the 
24-hour "Cartoon Network" and so many other channels devoted to children that previous 
generations - the last one raised on "Saturday morning cartoons" - could not have imagined 
today's variety; there exist department stores for toys such as Toys R Us; the Internet has 
children's sites; there are computer CDs for children devoted to games as well as learning 
reading and other skills - and so on. Yet today's Disney movies display cleavage; the Internet 
is deemed by many as dangerous to children because it exposes them It) perverts; and the 
Cartoon Network has an awful lot of advertisements aimed at adults even though it is pur­
portedly a children's channel. Even Las Vegas - referred to by Jean Baudrillard as "the great 
whore in the desert" - has been refurbished to be oriented toward children and families. The 
notorious 42nd Street in New York City has also been Disneyfied. History will record that no 
society prior to postemotional society was as committed to the fun of childhood. It is a soci­
ety geared toward instant and immediate gratification of impulses, not restraint.
But the Presidency, too, has fallen victim to this general trend. The unspoken truth 
about President Clinton's several alleged sexual escapades is that they send a message to the 
country that immediate gratification of sexual impulses outside of marriage and within a po­
sition of power is OK. Along with Las Vegas and 42nd Street, the White House has simulta­
neously become a focus of sexuality and "family-oriented" values. Without the public's moral 
indignation that a White House intern was apparently seduced by the President of the 
United States, the public is accepting two disparate propositions: one can and should send 
one's children to Washington DC for training in political values and one sends one's children
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there at their own risk sexually. But this is not fundamentally different from Las Vegas and 
other "sin cities" catering to sin and families simultaneously.
Is there a lesson here for postcommunist leaders? I think there is. The current Presi­
dent of France is supporting a theme park in the South of France that will simulate volca­
noes. This is a child-like departure from the more serious Mitterrand's focus on the Louvre. 
Tony Blair is supporting the construction of a hugely expensive "millennium dome" which will 
basically be a British Disneyworld. Even Presidential Libraries in the USA today are really 
imitations of Disneyworld rather than what they sound like they are (serious-sounding "li­
braries"). Postcommunist leaders have not learned this lesson yet: Milosevic treats Kosovo 
too seriously when he should turn it into a tourist attraction for children, like the Alamo in 
Texas. All of the postcommunist leaders need to consider turning their gulags and prisons 
from the Communist eras into American-styled tourist attractions. This will earn them not 
only tourist money, but understanding and empathy from the postemotional West, which is 
busily Disneyfying all of its sites of sin.
6. The postemotional President is backward-looking
On both the collective and individual levels of analysis, postemotional society's energy is 
focused on the past, not the future. The postmodernists have uncovered some of this ten­
dency in their writings on nostalgia and the recycling of music, fashion, films, and icons from 
the 1950s and 1960s. But this tendency extends far beyond popular culture. For example, 
some of the most significant political movements in the past few decades have been oriented 
toward the past: Following their education in France, the Ayatollah Khomeini tried to force 
Iran into the 12th century while Pol Pot attempted a similar, ancient, mythical "utopia" in 
Cambodia, respectively. The Serbs slaughtered Muslims in the 1990s in the name of a battle 
that occurred in 1389! Greece opposed Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia on the 
basis of a dispute over Macedonia's supposed role as the birthplace of Alexander the Great. 
The United States continues to suffer from its Vietnam Syndrome by avoiding all conflicts 
that can result in body bags, and engaging in short, winnable, 100% safe (for its warriors) 
wars. On local levels, too, one notices a similar tendency. The guides on the Riverwalk in San 
Antonio, Texas now refer to the San Antonio river by its Native American name. The Alamo 
is no longer referred to as a shrine to democracy - it really used to be called that, in writing - 
but has become a point of contention between Hispanics who claim that the Battle of the Al­
amo was fought for gold and Anglos who want to maintain the heroic version of events. From 
Scotland and Quebec to Kurdistan and long-forgotten peoples in Mongolia and Siberia, old 
cultural referents are being revived at a scale that most modernists could not have envisioned 
a generation ago.
Curiously, the American Presidency is not immune to this process. President Clinton is 
constantly trying to emulate his hero, JFK, and to re-create a simulated Camelot. In fact, 
President Clinton takes from any earlier President any aspect of his character or legacy as 
suits him at the moment: From JFK, the charm of youth and the stereotype of life in Came­
lot; from Nixon, a toughness toward Muslims; from Reagan, elementary supply-side econom­
ics; from Roosevelt, a supposed concern with the pain of every man and woman; from Lin­
coln, a multiculturalism and tolerance; from Jimmy Carter, the image of peacemaker in for­
eign affairs, etc. Ironically, President Clinton is said to be obsessed with his place in history, 
but will most likely not have such a "place" (in the old-fashioned sense) precisely because he 
is not making history through a focus on the present and the future.
Postcommunist nations are decidedly ambivalent on this point. On the one hand, they 
have the focus on the past down pat: Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, and Bosniak languages are 
being reinvented by going back to their "purity" centuries ago. This is but one example 
among many. On the other hand, postcommunist nations are anxious about their futures 
vis-ä-vis NATO, SECI, the EU, other organisations, and of course, the civil societies, free
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markets, and democratic principles mentioned at the outset. But here we have arrived full 
circle at the crux of the problem: Postcommunist societies, despite some tendencies toward 
postemotionalism, seem to be more forward-looking than Western nations, which are drown­
ing in nostalgia, simulacra, and postemotionalism.
7. The postemotional President is post-therapeutic and post-anxious
It used to be chic to refer to ours as the "age of anxiety." But anxiety has mutated into 
something new that is difficult to conceptualise. Whereas shame and guilt preserved the pri­
vacy of neurotics in previous eras, postemotional society impels individuals to expose their 
own innermost feelings and secrets as well as the secrets of others in the public media and/or 
to others. Nothing is really private any longer.
Thus, the sexual affairs of Presidents prior to Bill Clinton were kept secret on the basis 
of shame and guilt. But the entire world discusses Bill Clinton's sexual life. In other areas of 
life, too, the postemotional President has disclosed fears, confusions, and ambivalence dur­
ing press conferences that leaders prior to him would have found embarrassing to disclose. 
Such disclosures make Clinton likeable and enable ordinary Americans to conclude that he is 
as anxious as they are. Yet Americans do not hear Clinton's line, "I feel your pain," because 
postemotional society assumes that each person is locked in their own private universe of 
pain and meaning. There is no real sense of community anymore.
Postcommunist societies are nowhere near this state of post-anxious individualism. 
These societies are still driven by shame, guilt, and conformity to the expectations of various 
communities. If education in these countries continues to be geared toward making a good 
Slovene, Croat, Serb, or other nationalist citizen, he or she will be perceived as old-fashioned 
and somewhat dangerous by the postemotional West. On the other hand, who wants to edu­
cate their children to become lonely, isolated citizens of the global village but without any 
particular ties to village, family, neighbourhood, or even nation? Yet this is precisely what the 
postemotional West seems to be doing.
8. The postemotional President strives constantly to create fake communities
One of the most telling signs for postemotional society is the manner in which President 
Clinton's televised "town hall meetings" are staged. The very fact that a town hall meeting of 
yesteryear has to be staged bespeaks the nostalgia and focus on the past discussed earlier. 
But it also bespeaks a need to fake a feeling of community even though everyone knows that 
communities are pretty much extinct. Additionally, the simulation of community is driven by 
the anxiety that someone or a group will disrupt the idealised and televised sense of commu­
nity. Hence, the participants in these town hall meetings are carefully screened; their ques­
tions are rehearsed ahead of time; President Clinton's answers are rehearsed ahead of time; 
and he gets feedback from small groups that rate him prior to the telecast. The result is a 
flawless depiction of community and harmony in America. It should go without saying that is 
a far cry from the spontaneous and unpredictable town hall meetings that used to occur in 
historical reality.
One must not idealise community. Traditional communities included - and in many 
postcommunist countries, still include - racism, sexism, and many forms of intolerance that 
postemotional societies have sought to eliminate because of the focus on "nicenesy" Tradi­
tion - and inner-directed societies were anything but "nice." What is interesting sociologically 
is that instead of letting go of the need for traditional community - with its warts and all - as 
incompatible with the needs of postemotional society for a nice, tolerant social environment, 
the postemotional self seeks to be manipulated into participating in a fake and idealised 
sense of community.
174
Meštrović, S. G.: Making Sense of the Present.. Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXIX. (1998), No 3-4: 167-178
Thus, increasingly, political conventions are scripted and carefully controlled, as are 
most events that invite people to participate in a civic sense. The Presidential race between 
Bill Clinton and Bob Dole was scripted to an extreme degree. Synthetic "town hall meetings" 
were staged for the television camera; party conventions were scripted for the television me­
dium; the candidates' rhetoric was compressed into sound bytes suitable for contemporary 
television. Bob Dole was coached to smile and eschew old-fashioned, inner-directed expres­
sions of passion while Bill Clinton seems perfectly at ease in the other©directed ethos of 
managed niceness that looks constantly to the electorate as a jury of his peers. Similarly, PTA 
meetings, the openings of museums, football games, graduations, and other sites of "collec­
tive effervescence" are now carefully managed. The last thing that postemotional society 
wants is the spontaneous effusion of passions. Everyone knows that these events are staged, 
but they go along with the deceit for reasons already covered: nostalgia, anxiety that some­
thing unpleasant might happen, the need for niceness, infantile regression, and so on.
Ironically, the postemotional West has a lot to learn about the creation of what An­
thony Giddens (Giddens, 1995) calls "synthetic traditions" and communities from the post­
communist nations. (For a critique of Giddens on this point, see: S. Meštrović (1998) An­
thony Giddens: The Last Modernist. London: Routledge). Communists were masters of cre­
ating the fake community or "spontaneous" meeting, such as the highly orchestrated rally in 
Kosovo in 1989 that ignited the most recent Balkan War. Thus, as the West is preaching lib­
eralism, freedom, and openness to formerly Communist nations, it is increasingly engaging in 
near-totalitarian mind-control through the complete control of synthetic traditions and com­
munity life.
9. The postemotional President must be master of the empty gesture
NATO jets fly high over Albania - so high that nobody can hear or see them - yet one 
reads that these flights are meant to be construed as "signals" and warnings to Slobodan 
Milosevic of Serbia. Yet, clearly, Milosevic has not been getting the message for nearly a de­
cade now. Similarly, American missiles slam into suspected terrorist sites in Sudan and Af­
ghanistan, and again, these are supposed to be "signals" to terrorists. But everyone knows ter­
rorism has become more visible in the contemporary world and cannot be stopped by a few 
missiles. Increasingly, the postemotional President does little more than mouth some slogans 
that are often obviously out of touch with reality. For example, President Clinton, like most 
other politicians today, talks abut America's commitment to the rule of law at the same time 
that the USA is one of the few countries to oppose the establishment of a permanent Tribu­
nal to punish international war crimes. The President refers to America's commitment to hu­
man rights in many speeches, yet most analysts felt that he appeased Chinese oppressors 
upon his recent visit there. The hard truths that these empty gestures mask are that NATO is 
impotent, the West will not stop Belgrade-sponsored genocide, terrorism is growing, Amer­
ica refuses to make the giant leap toward rule of law internationally by supporting an inter­
national Tribunal, and appeasement seems to rule international politics today.
But could it be otherwise? Could the postemotional President take tough stands regard­
ing NATO, Serbia, China, and so on, and continue to enjoy high ratings in the polls? No, be­
cause committing the US to more than empty gestures in the world would force Americans 
to make sacrifices they are not prepared to make: to lose sons and daughters in battles; to al­
low Americans to go on trial for war crimes; to pay higher prices for goods if China were 
punished economically, and so on. The postemotional response of the empty gesture is the 
only one that really works in today's international politics, because it require minimal com­
mitment.
The postemotional President seems to grasp this intuitively. President Clinton's "travels" 
across America are post-modern in that they rely less on helicopters, buses, and planes, and
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more on television and the Internet. On his voyages through cyberspace and the airwaves he 
offers some sensational surprises to his constituencies: robots on Mars; the "world's finest ed­
ucation system;" a minimum stay of 48 hours in birthing rooms so mothers can introduce 
their babies to the world; 100,000 new police on the streets; 50,000 volunteers to register vot­
ers; lowering the budget deficit; eco-protection of canyons in Utah; help to the handicapped; 
minority rights to gays and lesbians; intellectual freedom to academics; discipline, strength, 
and resoluteness to soldiers; peace in Bosnia; peace in the Middle East; a supercomputer 
that can perform more calculations in a second than all Americans could compute in a thou­
sand years, etc.
Clinton's America is Disneyland. This, of course, is Baudrillard's central claim concern­
ing postmodernism: all of America is the simulation of Disneyland (Baudrillard, 1987). A 
world of imagination and illusions, a world from the Wizard of Oz. In one of his speeches, he 
summarised his vision for America: "strong economy, good schools, safe streets, a clean envi­
ronment, healthy children, successful families and communities." Where can one find such a 
place save Main Street USA in Orlando? Clinton offers a futuristic, utopian vision of Amer­
ica as the New World, the promised land of the 21st century, a land he wants to and knows 
how to lead American across "a bridge to the 21st century." According to the Nexus database, 
Clinton has used the bridge metaphor 243 times or 9.35 times per speech. The bridge meta­
phor taps into the American collective consciousness going back to mythical as well as real 
American crossings across rivers without bridges and to the romantic myths surrounding the 
Golden Gate Bridge, the Brooklyn Bridge, "bridging the gap," and other bridges, real or fic­
tional.
What does this imply for education and citizenship in postcommunist nations? It is the 
height of cynicism to suggest that postcommunist children should be taught to see through 
Disneyfied promises of bridges to a utopian future. Can civil society be built on a society of 
cynics? It is difficult to answer this question, yet clearly, Disneyfied civil society already pre­
supposes cynicism.
10. The postemotional President must smile and have nice teeth
Consider Senator Bob Dole's sour image in the last Presidential campaign versus the 
sunny, other-directed, nicest President ever, Bill Clinton. No matter what Dole said or did, 
he could not shake the grumpy image he created in the American consciousness. Dole's ad­
visers tried to get him to smile, but he couldn't get it right. This would be a fascinating re­
search project, to determine precisely what goes into the smile in postemotional society that 
is just right. Bill Clinton nas the just right smile. No matter how many scandals dog Bill 
Clinton, his ratings in the polls stay high because he is so "nice" and his smiling demeanour is 
somehow perfect. Take careful note of where and how the postemotional President smiles: 
With Nelson Mandela in Mandela's prison cell (is this a happy occasion by inner-directed 
standards?), with his wife at the very spot where African slaves were shoved into waiting 
ships (is this something to smile about?), at a "roast" where he poked fun at his problems 
with women who accuse him of sexual advances, and so on. By all accounts, including the 
kiss-and-tell book by his former advisor, Clinton's was a studied, carefully crafted niceness 
that signifies something about him as well as the American society that he leads. It is simply 
to glib to dismiss the meaning of the smile as empty, as the postmodernists do, or to ignore it, 
as the modernists do. The smile in postemotional society should be taken very seriously. It is 
a central component of appearing "nice." /
Having a nice smile goes with having nice teeth in postemotional society. History will no 
doubt record that no generation prior to this one had ever been as obsessed with clean, 
straight, pearly white teeth as this one. The nice smile is commensurate with the demand that
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the postemotional self must live in a "nice" neighbourhood, have a "nice" family, and have a 
"nice" life (not just a nice day). I contend that postemotional types seek out the nice smile 
and nice lifestyle because these signify that the Other is like "us" - anxious, tormented ways 
that are understandable, able to be manipulated in predictable ways, and ultimately safe or 
safer than the truly Other. The truly Other is the inner-directed type, the traditionalist, the 
fanatic, the fundamentalist, the terrorist, the symbol of chaos and rage that cannot be tamed, 
manipulated, or controlled. This is why Bill Clinton's ratings go up every time it is disclosed 
that he is "like us" in America. This is why Newt Gingrich and the Republicans will never 
sway the postemotional type - Republicans are terrifying in their non-smiling demeanour. 
This is why the friendly Slobodan Milosevic will never be stopped from brutalising seri- 
ous-looking non-Serbs who have serious-looking leaders. And so on.
The final lesson for the postcommunist world is that it must not become the terrifying 
Other for the postemotional West. Except for Slovenia, most of the rest of former Yugoslavia 
is precisely this symbol of Balkanization, chaos, and bloodlust that Americans fear. Russia, 
too, is frightening and seems non-nice. The postcommunist countries have to convince West­
ern Europe and the US that they are "like them." But this involves a double hermeneutic, and 
some tricky manoeuvring: One has to discern the simulated self-image of what the West 
thinks it is (namely, the beacon of human rights, freedom, democracy, and so on) and the re­
ality of what it is, namely, a postemotional and post-modern heap of contradictory tenden­
cies. If the postcommunist world aims at the simulated image of the West, it may lose in the 
long run because the West no longer really supports NATO, human rights outside its bor­
ders, freedom (it fears secessionism) and other Western ideals derived from the Enlighten­
ment. On the other hand, if the postcommunist nations aim at the cynical reality of the 
postemotional West by adopting public relations firms, hiring more lawyers, becoming more 
manipulative, electing smiling leaders and so on - they will become like the West. But the 
cost will be great. They will lose their souls. It is a difficult choice.
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NA TRAGU SMISLA DANAŠNJICE: 
GRAĐANIN I DEMOKRACIJA U 
POSTEMOTIVNIM I POSTKOMUNISTIČKIM 
DRUŠTVIMA
STJEPAN G. MEŠTROVIĆ
Texas A&M University, USA
Postemotivnost smatra da - usredsredivši se na pragmatičke i stvarne, 
što znači neakademske koncepte demokracije i građanina - nadilazi raspravu 
što su je nametnule moderna i postmoderna. Autorova analiza zahvaća po­
sebno uporedbama primjerene vidike postemotivnih javnosti i vođa u SAD, 
Zapadnoj Europi te postkomunističkim društvima.
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